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ABSTRACT: In “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion”, Michael Blake develops a new 
line of argument to defend a state’s presumptive right to exclude would-be immigrants. His 
account grounds this right on the state as a legal community that must protect and fulfill human 
rights. Although Blake’s present argument is valid and attractive in being less arbitrary than 
national membership and in distinguishing different types of immigrants’ claims, I dismiss it 
for being unsound due to a lack of further elaboration. The reason for my rejection is that there 
is a fundamental problem with the third premise as it stands now. Therefore, I contend that 
Blake’s argument cannot justify a general exclusion of well-protected would-be immigrants. 
However, in the final part, I will try to defend a modified version of Blake’s argument from 
imposed obligations by contending that a state has a presumptive right to exclude if the 
human rights obligations that are imposed on its residents go beyond a viable threshold.
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Introduction
The emergence of a global infrastructure and the increasing inequality in wealth, power, and security between nations have resulted in new waves of migration to affluent countries. This trend and its implications have turned many political 
theorists’ attention to the question of immigration. While some have argued for open-
borders,1 others have defended the state’s presumptive right to exclude would-be 
immigrants.2 Theorists on both sides have done so for different reasons. Joseph Carens 
made one of the first cases for open borders. He has argued that if one wants to be 
consistent with the three most prominent liberal approaches to political theory, namely 
1 See Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your 
Own Borders,” Political Theory 36, no. 1 (2008): 37-65; Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The 
Case for Open Border,” Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987): 251-273; Chandran Kukathas, “Why Open 
Borders?” Ethical Perspectives 4 (2012): 649-675; Kieran Oberman, “Immigration as a Human Right,” 
in Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, ed. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 32-56.
2 See Michael Blake, “The right to exclude.” Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 17 (2014): 521–37; David Miller, Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of 
Immigration (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016); Ryan Pevnick, Immigration 
and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 
1983); Christopher Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association.” Ethics 119, no. 1 (2008): 
109-141.
Benedikt Buechel is a Master’s candidate in International Studies at the Graduate School of International 
Studies, Seoul National University. He received his Bachelor’s degree in Philosophy and Business Studies 
from the University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany.
E-mail: bbuechel@snu.ac.kr
ISSN - 2464-9929, © ARISS, Global Politics Review, www.globalpoliticsreview.com  
Global Politics Review     99
the Rawlsian, the Nozickian, and the utilitarian, there is little justification for preventing 
people from immigrating to another state. Other pro-open border proponents like Arash 
Abizadeh, and Kieran Oberman have focused on democratic theory and human rights 
instead.
The proponents of a presumptive right to exclude, on the other hand, generally divide 
into three categories. Political theorists in the first category, like Michael Walzer and 
David Miller, develop a theory that seeks to justify the right to exclude on the basis 
that it is necessary to guarantee the social and cultural stability of political communities. 
Theorists in the second category, in comparison, make arguments for this right on deontic 
grounds. While Ryan Pevnick’s argument is based on the protection of collective property 
rights, Christopher Wellman has argued that the right to freedom of association requires 
that states have a right to exclude those with whom they do not want to associate.
Michael Blake also supports the claim for a presumptive right to exclude would-be 
immigrants. Pointing out some flaws of the previous accounts, however, he adds a new 
line of argument that is grounded on the state as a legal community that must protect 
and fulfill the human rights of everyone being within its territory. In this essay, I will 
first present Blake’s argument and then show why I think it cannot, without further 
elaboration, justify a general exclusion of well-protected would-be immigrants. After 
having considered a possible response to my criticism in the final part, I will try to defend 
a modified version of Blake’s argument form imposed obligations by contending that a 
state has a presumptive right to exclude if the human rights obligations that are imposed 
on its residents go  beyond a viable threshold.
Blake’s Argument
Blake is a ‘statist’. His argument starts from the assumption that states not only have 
commonly accepted characteristics but also that their existence is justified.3 He defines the 
state as an institution that has a permanent population and an effective government to rule 
over a jurisdictional domain.4 This definition implies that states are entitled to establish 
a system of rights and laws on their territory but not beyond. Besides the rights that are 
exclusively given by the state to its residents, there is a set of rights that is granted to 
everyone on the territory by virtue of being human. These latter so-called human rights 
impose three distinct obligations on states: to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.5 The state’s 
jurisdictional boundary does not, however, apply to all those human rights obligations. 
The first one is exceptional because it also extends to people outside of a state’s territory.6 
It entails that states must refrain from violating the human rights of people who reside 
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outside its borders. 
However, Blake’s argument focuses on the second and third obligations which relate 
only to those who are within a state’s jurisdiction. He points out that these two positive 
obligations have important implications. The protection and fulfilment of human rights 
demand some active effort on the side of states, namely the establishment of a variety of 
political institutions that can monitor the human rights situation, investigate violations, 
and educate people (Premise 1).7 But states cannot do it alone; their residents are obliged 
to support them in protecting and fulfilling the human rights of everyone within the 
territorial boundaries (P2).8 Hence, by setting foot on the jurisdictional domain of a 
state, immigrants also impose positive obligations on its current residents (P3).9 Blake, 
however, thinks that the imposition of obligations needs to be justified because people 
generally have a pro tanto right not to have their freedom be infringed upon without 
giving consent (P4).10 He assumes that the imposed obligations necessarily eliminate a 
set of options available to the current residents. In other words, residents cannot enjoy 
certain activities and fulfill their obligation towards immigrants at the same time.11 This 
leads to a situation in which people’s right to immigrate stands against the residents’ 
rights to freedom of choice. Blake elaborates on this condition by referring to Judith 
Jarvis Thomson’s example about a needy violinist. Although the violinist and would-
be immigrants have different characteristics and there are good reasons to condemn the 
former that do not apply to the latter, the analogy still shows that although people have a 
strong right to be protected, they are not free to choose who should fulfill that right.12 If 
their rights are already protected by the home state, there is no justification for infringing 
upon the freedom of another state’s residents.13 The conclusion from all this is that states 
have a presumptive right to exclude would-be immigrants in order to prevent them from 
imposing positive human rights obligations on their residents as long as there is no good 
reason to do otherwise (C).
In the final part of the essay, Blake considers two partly correct objections, namely the 
argument from federalism and the argument from oppression, that provide two conditions 
for when the presumptive right to exclude immigrants is defeated. The first objection 
tries to extend Blake’s argument from the state to its federal subunits. Blake rejects this 
extension, however, by pointing out that although the federal subunits might exercise 
partial jurisdiction they are bound to the central government’s legal framework.14 But 
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subunit, as a subject to a greater authority. The stronger version argues that a global 
political community has evolved which prohibits the exclusion of immigrants. However, 
Blake dismisses this argument as well because it is implausible to assume that there are 
sufficient state independent institutions on the global level.15 This is not the case for the 
weaker version. It provides the first condition for when the presumptive right to exclude 
is defeated. Blake acknowledges that are in fact transnational political communities, e.g. 
the European Union, that have the means to restrict their member state’s’ right to control 
the movement across their borders.16
The second objection is based on the argument from oppression. It notes that states 
cannot justify restrictions against insufficiently protected would-be immigrants.17 
Although Blake concedes to strong critique by making it the second condition for when 
the presumptive right to exclude is defeated, he points out two limitations. While all 
unprotected would-be immigrants have a general right to immigrate, they are also not 
free to choose any particular host country.18 In other words, they have no right to insist 
on permission in a Scandinavian country when being accepted in an Eastern European 
country. Moreover, would-be immigrants might have a duty to stay at home in order to 
assist their compatriots.19 But Blake denies such a special obligation towards the residents 
of one’s home country. He thinks that would-be immigrants only have a duty to stay if all 
citizens of the world provide comparable assistance. However, as long as this condition is 
not met, the argument is irrelevant.20
A summary of Blake’s argument and its six premises looks like the following: 
(P1) A state is responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human 
rights of only those people present within its territorial jurisdiction.
(P2) Each resident of a state is obligated to support its state’s capacity for hu-
man rights protection and fulfillment within this scope, and not beyond.
(P3) Immigrants impose obligations of this sort on current residents. 
(P4) People “have a presumptive right to be free from others imposing obliga-
tions on them without their consent”. Hence, an argument is required for 
defeating this presumption.
(P5) The presumption in (P4) is defeated if the would-be immigrants are not 
enjoying adequate human rights protection where they are.
(P6) The presumption in (P4) is also defeated if it applies to would-be immi-
grants that migrate within a transnational community, e.g. the European 
Union.






20 Ibid., 129. Kieran Oberman provides another strong counterargument against a special duty to stay. He 
argues that this duty to stay can only be justified if four conditions are met: See Kieran Oberman, “Can 
Brain Drain Justify Immigration Restrictions?” Ethics 123, no. 3 (2013): 453.
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ing under (P5)21 or (P6), because they impose positive human rights obli-
gations on its residents that cannot be justified.
Residents, Compatriots and Would-be Immigrants
The following section will show why I think that Blake’s argument for a presumptive 
right to exclude would-be immigrants is unsound due to a lack of further elaboration. 
My criticism will focus on the third premise which says that immigrants impose positive 
obligations on a state’s current residents; or alternatively that residents are obliged to do 
something in order to support their home state’s capacity to protect and fulfill the human 
rights of immigrants. 
This premise is problematic for three reasons. First, Blake says little about the exact 
content of the positive human rights obligations which are entailed in the third premise 
of the argument.22 In a thought experiment, he only mentions three particular ways in 
which residents are morally and legally obligated to protect and fulfill the human rights 
of immigrants: they have to pay for the police, serve on juries, and create political 
institutions.23
However, the first example, paying for the police, is contradicted just two pages later. 
By distinguishing the difference between costs and obligations, Blake highlights that 
having an obligation is not only about paying money to someone.24 The obligated person 
has to perform an ‘authentic’ act; it is authentic in the sense that it involves some time 
and effort. Although the second example, serving on juries, corresponds to this meaning, 
it is also problematic. While not all countries have a legal system that includes citizens 
in juries,25 the example is not only a hypothetical but seems also less relevant when 
applied to the well-protected would-be immigrants that can rightfully be excluded by 
Blake’s overall argument. Besides the more abstract demand for the creation of political 
institutions, the reader is left floundering what additional ‘authentic’ acts every individual 
21 Hereafter, referred as “well-protected would-be immigrants”.
22 In her criticism to Blake, Julie Arrildt also emphasizes that the obligations are vaguely defined. See Julie 
Arrildt, “State borders as defining lines of justice: why the right to exclude cannot be justified.,” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, (2016): 6. However, I think that her point is 
slightly different. By referring to Blake’s definitions of legal and moral obligations [a legal obligation 
as the elimination of ‘(…) my freedom to do a certain thing while not suffering a negative consequence’ 
and a moral obligation as the limitation of ‘(…) my moral right to do a particular thing’ (Michael Blake, 
“Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41 (2013a): 115)] she argues 
that Blake does not provide any explanation of the ‘things’ used in those definitions. Despite this being 
true, it is not the content of the rights (‘things’) outweighed by the obligations which need further 
explanation but rather the content of the imposed obligations, namely the particular action that must be 
performed to fulfil them. This is because only then, can we judge whether the right to immigrate can 
trump the residents’ right to freedom of choice and not vice versa.
23 Michael Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41 (2013): 
113.
24 Ibid., 114-5.
25 There are currently about 55 countries of which many are members of the Commonwealth. See Neil 
Vidmar, World Jury Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3.
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resident must perform to protect and fulfill the human rights of immigrants. However, 
this information is necessarily needed if one wants to judge whether the residents’ right to 
freedom of choice can outweigh the right to immigrate. 
Second, Blake does also not consider that would-be immigrants have the same 
obligations as the current residents once they have entered the state and become 
compatriots. Since not only benefits and burdens,26 but also obligations are reciprocal, 
residents impose as many obligations on accepted immigrants as vice versa. And they do 
so immediately; There is not a slight moment in which the accepted immigrants would 
be free to refuse moral and legal obligations towards their new compatriots. To defend 
his argument against this criticism, Blake must either take for granted that many would-
be immigrants do not have the means to fulfill their positive obligations as new residents 
or assume that they are more likely to violate the laws which in consequence increases 
the burden on the side of the state. Although the first correlation could be true, it does 
not change the essence of the criticism since it only applies to unprotected would-be 
immigrants that have good reasons to be included in the first place.
Finally, Blake points out that people impose moral obligations on one another all the 
time but that their extent differs by distance to the right bearer.27 A person who is closer 
to the right bearer, e.g. a resident to a compatriot compared to a resident to a would-be 
immigrant, seems to have a greater set of obligations.28 However, this is already a claim 
that must be defended. The extent of what is demanded might be less about the actual 
distance to the right bearer than about the ability to help in a given situation (See Singer 
1972).29 Blake acknowledges that distance and partiality cannot be the primary criteria 
for whether people have obligations towards one another or not. Residents have distinct 
obligations towards each other because they authorize and share liability to the state’s 
coercive mechanisms.30 This does not, however, exclude the necessity to fulfill even 
unwanted obligations, if the other’s right in question outweighs our freedom to refuse.31 
Despite egalitarianism and the elimination of relative poverty being only required within 
the domestic context of state coercion, sufficientarianism and the elimination of absolute 
poverty is still demanded in the international arena.32
However, state coercion does not provide a good justification for prioritizing residents 
26 Michael Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41 (2013): 
117.
27 Ibid., p. 118.
28 Michael Blake, Justice and foreign policy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 20.
29 See Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 1, no. 3 (1972): 229-
43
30 Blake, M. “Distributive justice. State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 30, 
(2001): 258.
31 Michael Blake, “Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41 (2013): 
119.
32 Michael Blake, “Distributive justice. State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 30, 
(2001): 264-5.
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over would-be immigrants since the latter are also subject to state’s’ coercive regime of 
border control.33 Although this is a strong counterargument, it cannot entirely challenge 
Blake’s distinction because its focus is not on state coercion itself, but rather on the 
residents’ consent to the coercive mechanisms. One could, nonetheless, argue that would-
be immigrants’ foundation for having political obligations is much stronger than those 
of most residents as they have all given explicit consent to state authority by crossing its 
borders. However, this does also not necessarily apply to all types of would-be immigrants. 
It is questionable whether unprotected immigrants really have a free choice when they 
make such a decision.34
A distinction between the often so-called special and general obligations is primarily 
irrelevant here because residents of a state already have the same positive human rights 
obligations towards their compatriots.35 At this point, it is hard to see how these obligations 
towards compatriots are in any sense different from the ones that are imposed by accepted 
immigrants. A state that already promotes human rights domestically will necessarily have 
and support the required political institutions. But if this is the case, the state’s current 
residents do not need to perform any additional ‘authentic’ act to protect and fulfill the 
human rights of accepted immigrants. Hence, would-be immigrants do not impose any 
additional human rights obligations on current residents that could justify their exclusion.
Defending a Modified Argument from Imposed Obligations
One could respond to all this in defense of Blake’s argument for a presumptive right to 
exclude would-be immigrants by arguing that although they do not impose any additional 
obligations there is a quantitative increase in what is already demanded.36 This argument 
assumes that there is a positive correlation between the number of people whose human 
rights can be protected and fulfilled by a political institution and the resources that such 
protection and fulfillment would require.37 This brings us back to the question of what 
33 Arash Abizadeh, “The Special Obligation Challenge to More Open Borders,” in Migration in Political 
Theory: The Ethics of Movement and Membership, ed. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 112-13.
34 David Hume makes a similar point about the link between consent and emigration. He argues that 
residents do not have the opportunity to show discontent with their government by leaving the country 
since they might lack the capacity to do settle somewhere else. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning 
the Principles of Morals, in Enquiries, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 
1975), 475.
35 Michael Kates and Ryan Pevnick, “Immigration, Jurisdiction, and History,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
42, (2014): 188.
36 Ibid.
37 Jan Brezger and Andreas Cassee contend that Blake’s argument from imposed obligations cannot 
justify a difference in treatment between would-be immigrants and resident citizens’ offspring. (See Jan 
Brezger and Andreas Cassee A., “Debate: Immigrants and newcomers by birth – Do statist arguments 
imply a right to exclude both?” The Journal of Political Philosophy 24, (2016): 267-8.) However, I do 
not think that their criticism can challenge the overall argument since it does not consider that Blake 
distinguishes two types of immigrants: unprotected and well-protected. While the former immigrants 
are not, the latter are very much different from newborn in that their subsistence is not dependent on 
others.
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exactly residents must do to support the state’s political institutions that protect and fulfill 
human rights. The most likely answer is to pay higher taxes. However, this objection fails 
for the same reasons as before. Blake has already denied that his argument is only about 
bearing higher costs since a fair share of the well-protected would-be immigrants might 
be financial blessing to the new host country.
A successful response must rather present some concrete examples. There are at least 
two human rights that impose positive obligations that require more from a state and 
its current residents than just additional financial resources: the right to adequate health 
and well-being, that includes the provision of medical care (article 25), and the right 
to education (article 26). Both human rights can only be protected and fulfilled if there 
are enough people who can provide these services. One could respond to this problem 
by pointing out that a deficiency in human resources could be resolved through market 
intervention. Given that both doctors and teachers are part of the public-sector workforce, 
the state could create new jobs to achieve optimal allocation. However, there are also 
limits to economic theory. First, such state intervention to resolve the market shortage 
would take some time. Consequently, there would be a period in which not every resident’s 
human rights to medical care and education could be fulfilled. Second, since both jobs 
require high qualifications, a state might not have the human capital to fill an increased 
number of vacancies in the education and medical sector. Third, and most importantly, 
a state’s residents cannot be obliged to become doctors and teachers because there is an 
increasing number of would-be immigrants who want to enter their home country.38
Although this does not justify a general right to exclude a particular type of would-be 
immigrant, it grants a state a presumptive right to exclude if the human rights obligations 
that are imposed on its residents go beyond a viable threshold.39 Despite the difference in 
argument, I agree with Blake that states have good reasons to rank would-be immigrants 
by their level of protection at home if there is a sudden influx beyond a viable threshold. 
If a state has the capacity to protect and fulfill the human rights of an additional number 
of 100,000 would-be immigrants but 200,000 want to enter, it is justified in enacting a 
need-based prioritization and excluding those who are already well protected outside the 
transnational community to which it belongs.40 This means that regardless whether the 
viable threshold is reached or not, the presumption is defeated if the would-be immigrants 
migrate within a transnational community or are not enjoying adequate human right 
38 Michael Blake, Justice and foreign policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 23-4.
39 Kieran Oberman who has argued for a human right to immigrate does agree that restrictions might be 
justified in extreme circumstances in which the acceptance of immigrants leads to high social cost. See 
Kieran Oberman, “Immigration as a Human Right,” in Migration in Political Theory: The Ethics of 
Movement and Membership, Ed. Sarah Fine and Lea Ypi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 33-4. 
The here presented argument to viable threshold is different in that it grants a presumptive right that is 
not grounded on cost but on obligations.
40 This example should not create the impression that the viable threshold is always fixed; it correlates with 
the state’s capacity to fulfil and protect the human rights of those people present within its territorial 
jurisdiction.
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protection where they are since there are more immediate basic needs than education and 
medical care.
The modified version of Blake’s argument has six premises and looks like the following:
 
(P1) A state is responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling the human 
rights of only those people present within its territorial jurisdiction.
(P2) Each resident of a state is obligated to support its state’s capacity for hu-
man rights protection and fulfillment within this scope, and not beyond. 
(P3) Each immigrant imposes cumulative obligations of this sort on current 
residents.
(P4) People have a presumptive right to be free from others imposing obliga-
tions on them beyond a viable threshold. 
(P5) Regardless whether the viable threshold is reached or not, the presumption 
in (P4) is defeated if the would-be immigrants are not enjoying adequate 
human right protection where they are.
(P6) The presumption in (P4) is also defeated if it applies to would-be immi-
grants that migrate within a transnational community, e.g. the European 
Union.
(C) A state has a presumptive right to exclude would-be immigrants, not fall-
ing under (P5) or (P6), if the human rights obligations that are imposed on 
its residents go beyond a viable threshold.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have dismissed Blake’s argument for a presumptive right to exclude would-
be immigrants for being unsound. The reason for my rejection is that there are three 
problems with the third premise as it stands now. First, Blake says little about the exact 
content of the imposed obligations. However, without such information, it is impossible 
to judge whether the residents’ right to not have their freedom be infringed upon can 
outweigh the right to immigrate. The second problem is that, compared to what is owed 
to compatriots, would-be immigrants do not seem to impose any additional human rights 
obligations which could justify their exclusion. Third, Blake also does not consider that 
would-be immigrants have the same obligations as the current residents once they have 
entered the state and become their compatriots. This criticism does not, however, mean 
that states have no presumptive right to exclude well-protected would-be immigrants. 
By providing a modified version of Blake’s argument from imposed obligations, I have 
contended that a state has such a presumptive right if the human rights obligations that are 
imposed on its residents go beyond a viable threshold.
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